) 


'"/ 


OBSERVATIONS 


ON    THE 


ORIGIN  AND  CONDUCT 


OF    THE 


WAR  WITH  MEXICO 


From  the  Democratic  Review,  for  April. 


N  £  W- YORK  : 


1847. 


£4-07 


OBSERVATIONS 


ON 


THE    ORIGIN    AND    CONDUCT   OF 


WAR  WITH  MEXICO. 


IT  "has  been  the  fortune  of  this  country,  perhaps  its  misfortune,  to  have 
become  involved  in  hostilities  with  a  neighboring  republic.  Such  a  state 
of  things  was  contemplated  many  years  ago  however,  as  possible,  by  our 
leading  statesmen,  to  whom  no  intentions  of  precipitate  action,  nor  any 
ambitious  designs,  were  ever  attributed.  Indeed,  we  may  safely  aver,  that  if 
hostilities  had  been  commenced  against  Mexico  long  before  the  annexation 
of  Texas,  the  people  of  this  country  would  have  been  ready  to  sustain  such 
a  measure,  and  have  given  it  their  hearty  approval. 

The  subsequent  causes  which  have  arisen  for  the  attitude  we  have  assumed, 
resulting  from  the  addition  of  Texas  to  the  Union,  would  in  all  probability 
have  never  been  questioned,  if  an  internal  discord  of  opinion  had  not  pre 
vailed  among  ourselves,  on  the  subject  of  slavery.  This  has  led  to  opposi 
tion  in  certain  quarters,  to  the  measures  of  the  Government,  and  has  drawn 
public  attention  too  much  from  the  consideration  of  the  war  as  a  national 
measure  of  public  justice,  as  well  as  from  its  origin,  conduct,  and  real 
character. 

These  are  questions  which  belong  to  history,  which  other  nations  will 
regard  with  interest,  and  in  that  view  they  should  be  treated.  The  theory 
of  our  domestic  institutions,  the  provisions  of  our  constitution,  and  the  con 
flicting  opinions  of  politicians  on  slavery,  have  nothing,  or  should  have  noth 
ing  to  do  with  the  broad  question  of  our  relations  with  Mexico.  This  is 
an  independent  topic,  and  should  be  treated  as  such.  We  are  not  willing 
that  the  judgment  of  the  age  should  be  warped  by  irrelative  issues.  To 
contribute  our  humble  share,  therefore,  to  a  right  exposition  of  the  case, 
we  shall  proceed  briefly  to  examine  the  origin  and  conduct  of  the  war. 

We  may  start  with  the  proposition,  then,  that  our  relations  with  Mex 
ico  for  twenty  years  past  have  been  of  an  offensive  and  threatening 
character.  The  attention  of  Congress  has  again  and  again  been  attracted 
to  their  condition,  not  only  by  the  communications  of  successive  Presidents, 
but  by  the  earnest  petitions  of  our  citizens,  asking  for  redress  and  indemnity 
for  unprovoked  and  eminently  unjust  aggressions  on  our  commerce.  No. 
nation  on  earth  would  have  so  long  refrained  from  exacting  justice  from  Mex 
ico  by  force  of  arms  as  we  have  done.  We  have  borne  our  wrongs  from  her 
wiik  patience,  until  patience  has  ceased  to  be  a  virtue.  In  our  negotiations 


4  The  Mexican  War — Its  Origin  and  Conduct. 

with  France  for  redress  of  similar  wrongs,  the  language  of  President  Jackson, 
bold  and  even  denunciatory,  was  applauded  by  the  people.  And  during 
our  difficulties  with  England  in  relation  to  the  North-western  boundary  and 
the  territory  of  Oregon,  not  a  lisp  of  censure  was  heard  from  those  lips  now 
pouring  forth  their  imprecations  on  the  war  with  Mexico.  We  heard  only  of 
aspirations  for  the  continuance  of  honorable  peace.  But  now  an  element  of 
mischief  is  at  work.  Wrongs  committed  by  Mexico,  in  the  opinion  of 
some  writers,  are  no  wrongs,  because  slavery  has  not  been  exterminated  in 
Texas.  Improper  and  ill-timed  issues  have  been  made,  and  "  all  seems 
yellow  to  the  jaundiced  eye." 

After  years  of  negotiation,  our  Government  succeeded  in  arranging  a 
Convention  for  the  adjustment  and  settlement  of  our  claims,  pursuant  to  a 
treaty  made  and  ratified  by  both  countries.  Any  nation  pretending  to  re 
spectability  of  character,  would  have  sought  to  carry  out  the  provisions  of 
such  a  treatv.  But  what  was  the  result  in  the  case  of  Mexico  1  A  gross 
violation  of  the  stipulated  conditions  of  the  payment  of  our  claims  occurred 
before  one  third  of  the  debt  had  been  liquidated  ;  and  during  the  sessions  of 
the  convention  itself,  the  most  frivolous,  unjust,  and  deceptive  means  were 
resorted  to,  to  prevent  a  full  acknowledgment  and  recognition  of  those 
claims. 

Even  Mr.  Webster  has  admitted,  what  evevy  honest  American  must  admit, 
that  the  United  States  had  well  founded  claims  against  Mexico,  and  that 
Mexico  has  behaved  most  wrongfully  towards  us.  Indeed,  to  assert  the  con 
trary,  would  be  to  falsify  the  history  of  our  country,  and  discredit  its  official 
documents.  The  abrupt  termination  of  this  convention,  after  a  studied 
delay  on  the  part  of  the  Mexican  Commissioners,  left  a  large  majority  of  our 
American  claims  unsettled ;  those  which  were  allowed  were  never  fully 
satisfied,  and  those  which  should  have  been  so,  were  thrown  aside,  and  the 
applicants  for  indemnity  were  left  to  bear  up  against  the  loss  of  their  property 
and  the  ruin  of  their  hopes  as  best  they  could.  The  idea  that  the  com 
merce  of  this  country  can  be  preyed  upon  for  years,  arid  that  our  merchants 
and  shippers  may  be  ruined  by  every  association  of  plunderers  who  can 
get  our  property  into  their  power,  is  an  absurdity  too  gross  to  need  exposure. 
This  Union  was  formed  for  high  arid  useful  purposes,  and  not  the  least  of 
these,  was  the  protection  of  the  life,  liberty  and  property  of  American 
citizens. 

The  annexation  of  Texas  is  considered  as  one  of  the  causes  of  the  war, 
and  so  it  has  been  treated  both  in  the  newspapers  arid  on  the  floor  of  Con 
gress.  That  it  has  to  do  with  the  war  we  will  not  deny ;  but  if  it  has  been 
made  a  cause  of  difficulty,  Mexico  alone  is  responsible  for  the  consequences. 
This  distinction  should  be  kept  up  in  the  minds  of  all  reflecting  persons. 
The  annexation  of  Texas  was  not  an  act  of  War  on  our  part.  That  was  a 
Republic  which  had  taken  its  place  among  the  nations  01'  the  earth.  Its 
freedom  was  recognised  officially  by  the  most  powerful  of  the  European 
Governments,  and  diplomatic  intercourse,  according  to  the  laws  of  nations, 
had  grown  up  between  Texas  and  its  new  found  friends.  The  recogni 
tion  of  its  independence  being  thus  general,  and  fully  established,  left  it  the 
power  to  seek  the  alliance  of  France  or  England,  or  more  wisely,  to  become 
a  member  of  a  confederacy,  where  the  JEgis  of  liberty  could  be  held  up  for 
its  protection,  and  where  it  could  affiliate  with  kindred  interests,  hopes 
and  destinies. 

Even  Mexico  had  admitted  this  independent  position  of  Texas,  by  a  pro 
position  and  an  effort  to  negotiate.  There  was  no  doubt  then,  and  there 
can  be  no  doubt,  that  the  annexation  of  Texas  was  no  just  cause  of  offence 
to  Mexico.  Indeed,  after  all  the  angry  correspondence  between  the 


BANCROFT 

The  Mexican  War — Its  Origin  and  Conduct.  5 

Secretary  of  State  and  our  former  minister  at  the  capital,  a  new  negotia 
tion  was  agreed  upon,  and  might  have  terminated  honorably  and  peacefully 
to  both  parties,  but  for  the  fresh  misconduct  of  the  Mexican  Government. 

Our  minister,  sent  out  in  good  faith  and  under  a  pledge  that  he  should 
be  received  and  accredited — our  squadron  withdrawn  from  the  Mexican 
coasts,  and  our  earnest  proffers  of  amity,  were  only  made  the  bases  of  new 
insults,  and  the  commission  of  an  act  of  inhospitality  and  bad  faith  towards 
that  minister,  whose  life  indeed  was  scarcely  safe  in  the  hands  of  a  perfidious 
people.  The  treatment  of  Mr.  Slidell  was  of  itself  cause  of  war,  as  well  for 
its  injurious  effects  upon  the  national  honor  and  character,  as  because  it 
was  an  act  jeoparding  those  high  and  lofty  principles,  which,  by  recognising 
a  solemn  embassy,  permit  Governments  to  arrange  their  difficulties  through 
their  diplomatic  agents,  and  give  assurance  that  the  good  faith  of  nations 
is  yet  a  guarantee  for  the  preservation  of  their  commercial  and  political  rela 
tions. 

Texas  becoming  an  integral  portion  of  the  United  States,  was  immediately 
entitled  to  the  protection  afforded  to  the  other  members  of  the  confederacy. 
The  boundary  of  the  new  state,  as  claimed  by  it,  was  recognised  by  the 
nations  of  the  earth  when  they  recognised  its  independence.  Mr.  Clay, 
however  much  he  may  have  opposed  the  measures  of  the  present  administra 
tion,  has  distinctly  asserted,  that  by  the  treaty  of  Louisiana,  the  boundary, 
as  claimed  by  Texas,  was  fully  established.  In  1836,  the  Congress  of 
Texas  declared  the  Rio  del  Norte  to  be  the  boundary  of  the  Republic ;  it  had 
"  exercised  and  extended  its  jurisdiction"  beyond  the  Nueces  ;  that  portion 
of  territory  south  of  the  Rio  had  been  represented  in  the  Congress  of 
Texas ;  and  finally,  in  1845,  our  own  Congress  had  included  it  within  the 
circle  of  our  revenue  system,  placing  officers  to  reside  there  for  the  very 
purpose  of  supervising  and  sustaining  it.  Thus  this  country  in  each  par 
ticular  committed  itself  on  this  boundary  question  ;  and  as  the  representatives 
of  all  parties  in  Congress  assented  to  it,  it  became  indisputably  a  settled 
question,  "  odorous  with  nationality." 

Other  measures  became  unavoidable,  from  the  very  nature  of  things,  and 
Texas  was  as  much  entitled  to  our  sympathy  and  protection,  as  any  portion 
of  the  confederacy.  That  protection  was  needed,  is  a  matter  of  history.  A 
Mexican  force  threatened  a  fresh  attack,  and  Texas,  worn  out  with  its  long 
and  bloody  struggle  for  freedom,  required,  as  it  had  a  right  to  do,  our  prompt 
assistance.  Thus  we  perceive  there  was  an  imperious  necessity  for  action  on 
our  part;  the  collection  of  the  revenue,  important  enough  even  in  times  of 
peace,  to  make  the  employment  of  a  fleet  of  armed  cutters  indispensable, 
and  the  defence  of  our  territory,  demanded  the  presence  of  an  American  force 
in  the  quarter  threatened.  The  manner  in  which  this  was  done,  was  marked 
with  as  much  judgment  as  delicacy. 

The  President,  through  his  Secretary  of  War,  placed  a  small  force  under 
the  command  of  Col.  Taylor,  Brevet  Brigadier  General,  an  experienced  and 
brave  officer,  and  by  no  means  a  senior  of  his  grade.  The  propriety  of  this 
first  movement  is  highly  worthy  of  commendation.  There  was  no  display 
of  any  of  the  pomp  and  circumstance  of  war — no  great  military  effort — no 
thrusting  forward  of  superior  general  officers,  as  if  some  grand  design  was 
intended  ;  it  was  the  mere  disposition  of  a  command,  in  the  manner  con 
stantly  practised  by  our  Government,  to  protect  a  distant  post,  and  as 
has  for  years  been  usual  upon  the  rivers  and  prairies  of  the  far  west.  Still 
further  to  determine  the  character  of  this  movement,  we  have  only  to  look 
at  the  instructions  given  by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  General  Taylor,  which 
were,  to  abstain  from  all  aggressive  conduct  towards  Mexico  and  the  Mexi 
cans,  and  to  commit  no  act  of  hostility  unless  in  self-defence. 

In  the  selection  of  General  Taylor,  the  War  Department  displayed  great 


I 

6  The  Mexican  War— Its  Origin  and  Conduct. 

sagacity  and  good  sense ;  and  in  relieving  him  from  the  control  of  his  superior 
officers  in  the  southern  military  department,  it  left  him  free  to  act  according- 
to  the  dictates  of  his  own  excellent  judgment.  His  former  services  had 
established  his  reputation,  and  his  conduct  confirmed  the  good  opinion  en 
tertained  of  him  at  Washington.  And  it  is  evident,  upon  the  perusal  of  the 
recently  published  correspondence,  that  his  opinions  were  frankly  sought, 
and  generally  as  frankly  adopted. 

It  is  also  evident  that  the  whole  procedure  of  Gen.  Taylor  was  in  con 
templation  of  a  pacific  mission.  In  a  letter  to  Gen.  Worth,  he  declared  he 
apprehended  no  collision ;  and  that  General  Worth  entertained  the  same 
opinion,  is  evident  from  his  returning  to  the  United  States  and  desiring  to 
throw  up  his  commission.  Those  who  would  charge  the  Government  with 
a  desire  to  commence  war,  must,  therefore  shut  their  eyes  to  the  instructions 
of  the  President  to  Gen.  Taylor,  as  well  as  to  the  recorded  opinions  of  that 
disereet  officer,  that  there  would  be  no  collision,  opinions  of  which  he  made 
no  secret  whatever.  The  Mexicans  took  the  initiative,  with  their  usual 
craftiness  and  love  of  blood.  The  massacre  of  Col.  Cross  and  of  Lieutenant 
Porter,  and  the  unprovoked  attack  upon  the  command  of  Captains  Thorn 
ton  and  Hardie,  were  demonstrations  of  hostility,  worthy  only  of  barbarians 
and  murderers,  and  these  were  upon  territory  not  only  known  as  a  portion 
of  Texas,  but  admitted  to  be  such  in  an  official  proclamation  by  Gen.  Woll, 
one  of  the  officers  of  Mexico  herself!  The  American  Government  was  at  all 
times  willing  to  treat  with  Mexico.  It  was  Mexico,  unwilling  to  receive  the 
olive  branch,  that  must  fairly  be  charged  with  a  premeditated  design  to  make 
war. 

And  here  we  may  pause  for  a  moment  to  contemplate  the  character  of 
the  instructions  given  to  the  American  commander  by  the  Secretary  of 
War.  In  the  letter  of  July  9,  1846,  a  spirit  of  forbearance  and  magna 
nimity  breathes  in  every  line,  humanity  influences  every  dictate,  and  the 
pacific  intentions  of  the  Government  are  everywhere  apparent.  In  the 
appeal  made  to  the  Mexicans  themselves,  through  an  official  proclamation 
prepared  at  Washington,  the  people  of  Mexico  are  alluded  to  with  kindness 
far  greater  than  they  deserved ;  and  only  against  their  betrayers  and  oppres 
sors,  the  real  causes  of  their  misery,  were  its  denunciations  uttered. 

War  then  existed  by  the  acts  of  Mexico  herself;  and  our  own  Congress, 
unable  to  shut  its  eyes  to  the  fact,  officially  recognized  its  existence.  The 
battles  of  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  the  siege  of  Fort  Brown,  the 
capture  of  Matamoras,  and  the  advance  upon  and  storming  of  Monterey, 
followed  in  brilliant  succession.  They  are  events  too  well  known  to  need  our 
eulogy ;  they  are  such,  to  use  the  language  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  as  entitle 
them  to  be  considered  everywhere  "  examples  of  courage  and  of  skill, 
scarcely  excelled  in  the  history  of  military  operations."  They  have  been 
followed  up  by  a  disposition  of  our  forces,  which  cannot  fail  to  close  the 
war  with  immortal  honor  to  the  American  arms. 

he  plans  upon  which  the  war  has  been  conducted,  have  been  the  subject 
of  much  discussion.     And  by  many  a  caviller 

"  That  never  set  a  squadron  in  the  field, 
Nor  the  division  of  a  battle  knows 
More  than  a  spinster." 

Studiously  keeping  out  of  view  the  chief  and  controlling  principles  which 
have  all  along  governed  the  action  of  the  President  and  the  War  Department, 
such  persons  have  been  as  unfair  in  their  criticisms,  as  they  have  been  un 
sound  in  their  opinions.  At  one  time  the  administration  was  charged  with 
sending  a  small  army  to  be  cut  off,  thus  abandoning  the  idea  of  Us  being 
adequate  to  a  war  of  conquest,  and  at  others,  with  the  intention  of  destroy^ 


The  Mexican  War — Its  Origin  and  Conduct.  7 

ing  the  whole  Mexican  population.  At  one  time  the  supposed  plans  of 
the  campaign  have  been  denounced  as  absurd  and  ridiculous  ;  and  now 
again,  as  success  has  nobly  vindicated  the  ability  in  which  they  were  con 
ceived,  they  are  claimed  as  the  suggestions  of  General  Scott.  In  short,  it 
is  utterly  impossible  to  imagine  any  operations  which  would  have  met 
with  approval  in  the  quarters  to  which  we  have  alluded. 

Now  we  venture  to  assert,  that  no  military  enterprises  undertaken  by  this 
country,  have  ever  before  been  so  successful ;  and  history  will  not  only  stamp 
the  actions  of  the  war  as  brilliant  in  the  highest  degree,  but  also  pronounce 
its  conduct  by  the  appropriate  Departments  sagacious  and  masterly. 

The  Secretary  of  War  was  first  called  on  to  post  a  small  force  on  the 
boundary  line  of  Mexico.  He  did  so,  and  the  army  and  the  commander 
proved  fully  adequate  to  the  purpose.  With  unexampled  celerity  the 
scattered  forces  of  the  nation  were  gathered  together,  consolidated  and 
placed  in  position,  and  the  commanding  officer  had  full  power  to  increase 
his  strength. 

The  military  power  of  the  National  Government  was  thus  early  placed  at 
his  disposal,  and  he  was  armed  with  all  the  additional  resources  which  the 
laws  would  permit,  to  meet  any  possible  exigency.  If  that  force  had  proved 
in  any  way  at  first  inadequate,  the  responsibility  must  clearly  have  fallen  on 
the  commanding  officer.  The  Secretary  of  War  had  exhausted  his  means 
under  the  existing  law,  providing  for  the  extension  arid  equipment  of  the 
regular  force  to  be  employed  in  Texas.  The  President  had  not  the 
right  to  call  for  volunteers,  without  a  special  act  of  Congress,  or  under  the 
Constitutional  emergency  of  an  invasion  of  the  territory  of  the  Union. 
The  existence  of  this  emergency  as  a  fact  on  which  to  base  a  call,  could 
not  be  known  at  Washington  in  time  to  be  made  available.  That  was  an 
occasion,  which  the  conduct  of  the  Mexican  troops  only  could  create.  So 
far  indeed  was  General  Taylor  from  complaining  of  a  want  of  troops, 
that  he  actually  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  his  chief  embarrass 
ment  was  in  having  too  many  !  But  suppose,  on  the  contrary,  he  found  his 
force  too  small ;  the  only  legitimate  means  of  remedying  its  inferiority,  was 
by  a  call  upon  the  authorities  of  the  states  for  aid,  and  to  do  this  he  had 
early  and  timely  instructions  from  the  War  Department.  Let  those  who 
would  assail  its  efficient  head  refer  to  the  documental  evidence  at  hand, 
and  blush  for  their  unfairness.  On  the  23d  of  August,  1845,  the  Secretary 
of  War  wrote  to  General  Taylor  as  follows : 

"  The  information  hitherto  received  as  to  the  intentions  of  Mexico,  and  the 
measures  she  may  adopt,  does  not  enable  the  administration  here  to  give  you  more 
explicit  instructions  in  regard  to  your  movements,  than  those  which  have  been 
already  forwarded  to  you.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  Mexico  is  making 
efforts  to  assemble  a  large  army  on  the  frontier  of  Texas,  for  the  purpose  of  en 
tering  its  territory  and  holding  forcible  possession  of  it.  Of  their  movements  you 
are  doubtless  advised,  and  we  trust  have  taken,  or  early  will  take,  prompt  and 
efficient  steps  to  meet  and  repel  any  such  hostile  incursion.  Should  Mexico  as 
semble  a  large  body  of  troops  on  the  Rio  Grande,  and  cross  it  with  a  considerable 
force,  such  a  movement  must  be  regarded  as  an  invasion  of  the  United  States,  and 
the  commencement  of  hostilities.  You  will,  of  course,  use  all  the  authority  which 
has  been  or  may  be  given  you  to  meet  such  a  state  of  things.  Texas  must  be  pro 
tected  from  hostile  invasion,  and  for  that  purpose  you  will,  of  course,  employ  to  the 
utmost  extent  all  the  means  you  possess  or  can  command.  An  order  has  this  day 
been  issued,  for  sending  one  thousand  more  men  into  Texas  to  join  those  under 
your  command.  When  the  existing  orders  are  carried  into  effect,  you  will  have 
with  you  a  force  of  4,000  men  of  the  regular  army.  We  are  not  enabled  to  judge 
what  auxiliary  force  can,  upon  an  emergency,  be  brought,  together  from  Texas  ;  and 
as  a  precautionary  measure,  you  are  authorized  to  accept  volunteers  from  the  states 


8  The  Mexican  War— Its  Origin  and  Conduct. 

of  Louisiana  and  Alabama,  and  even  from  Mississippi,  Tennessee  and  Kentucky. 
Should  Mexico  declare  war,  or  commence  hostilities  by  crossing  the  Rio  Grande 
with  a  considerable  force,  you  are  instructed  to  lose  no  time  in  giving  information 
to  the  authorities  of  each  or  all  of  the  above  states." 

And  General  Taylor,  in  the  contemplated  emergency,  did  avail  himself 
of  this  authority. 

Thus,  it  seems  that  every  preparation  was  made  EIGHT  MONTHS  in  ad 
vance  of  the  possible  emergency  of  General  Taylor's  position,  by  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  ;  full  power  was  given  him  to  act,  and  the  authorities  of  the 
states  alluded  to  were  informed  of  his  power  to  make  the  necessary  requi 
sitions. 

General  Taylor,  at  his  own  discretion,  took  the  course  he  did.  He  had 
confidence  in  himself— in  his  officers  and  troops  ;  and  whether  his  move 
ment  under  his  instructions,  to  bring  up  supplies  from  Point  Isabel,  was 
such  a  one  as  he  should  have  been  compelled  to  make,  after  planting  his 
standard  at  Matamoras,  is  a  matter  which  is  now  of  no  consequence.  The 
Mexicans  attempted  to  destroy  his  army  and  were  defeated  themselves.  To 
have  gained  such  battles,  would  be  a  sufficient  excuse  for  any  mistake  or 
misapprehension  of  the  views  of  the  enemy. 

In  tracing  out  the  immediate  consequences  of  these  actions,  it  has  been 
urged  that  General  Taylor  should  have  pursued  the  Mexicans  across  the 
Kio  Grande.  But  after  the  fatigue  of  two  hard-fought  actions,  it  is  very 
doubtful,  to  say  the  least,  whether  it  would  have  been  prudent  to  follow  the 
fugitive  foe  into  that  swift  current  where  so  many  lost  their  Jives.  Had  the 
plans  of  the  Secretary  of  War  been  fully  carried  out  by  Congress,  there  is 
scarcely  a  doubt  that  the  defeated  army  might  have  been  captured.  In  his 
report  of  the  5th  of  December,  1846,  it  is  distinctly  stated,  that  the  De 
partment  had,  for  years  previously,  asked  for  an  appropriation  to  construct 
ponton  bridges,  but,  as  is  too  often  the  case  with  our  representatives,  they 
paid  no  attention  to  the  suggestion.  Had  it  been  adopted  in  time,  no  doubt 
the  immediate  consequences  of  General  Taylor's  victory  would  have  been 
equally  as  brilliant  as  the  conflicts  themselves. 

The  river  was  at  length  crossed,  and  the  American  flag  was  hoisted  at 
Matamoras.  The  American  drum-beat  was  then  heard,  for  the  first  time, 
upon  the  Mexican  territory. 

Thus  far,  we  believe,  we  have  made  out,  to  the  satisfaction  of  every  intel 
ligent  and  candid  mind,  whatever  may  be  its  political  bias,  a  com 
plete  vindication  of  the  course  of  the  Government  previously  and  up  to  the 
occupation  of  the  west  bank  of  the  Rio  Grande.  In  no  other  light  can  this 
course  be  viewed,  if  we  regard  the  truth  of  history  or  the  obligations  of 
candor. 

Here  a  new  question  arises — were  OFFENSIVE  OPERATIONS  just  or  expedi 
ent  after  that  event1?  No  one  can  deny  the  right  of  a  state  to  make  war, 
and  it  is  the  only  resource  among  nations  where  remonstrance  fails ;  and  it 
is  an  admitted  principle  which  no  one  can  deny,  that  during  war,  the  public 
force — the  navies  and  armies  of  a  nation — may  lawfully  be  employed  to  de 
stroy  the  navies  and  armies  of  its  enemy.  And  some  eminent  writers,  on 
what  are  termed  the  rights  of  war,  have  advocate  J  the  infliction  of  extreme 
severities  upon  those  who  have,  by  a  protracted  resistance,  caused  the  un 
necessary  effusion  of  blood.  This  principle,  though  acted  upon  by  the  ar 
mies  of  European  powers,  has  not  been  adopted  by  us.  So  far  from  this,  there 
is  not  an  instance  of  our  forces  having  availed  themselves  of  the  plunder  of 
the  places  they  have  captured,  as  at  Monterey,  nor  have  our  commanders 
exercised  the  power  of  exacting  contributions,  which  is  admitted  by  eminent 
jurists  to  be  within  the  just  rights  of  a  conquering  force. 


The  Mexican  War — Its  Origin  and  Conduct.  9 

We  have  not,  since  the  commencement  of  our  operations  upon  the 
west  side  of  the  Rio  Grande,  availed  ourselves  of  the  extreme  rights  of  our 
position ;  and  while  the  most  savage  and  assassin-like  murders  have  been 
committed  by  the  Mexicans  upon  those  unfortunate  Americans  who  have 
fallen  accidentally  into  their  hands,  our  troops  have  humanely  forgotten  the 
animosities  which  war  creates,  and  have  treated  their  undeserving  captives 
as  friends  and  brothers. 

Though  Napoleon  asserted  that  war  must  support  war,  our  policy 
has  been  different.  Our  army  has  paid  liberally  for  its  supplies  ;  it  has 
afforded  protection  to  the  territory  captured ;  and  its  effective  action,  though 
preceded  by  the  smoke  of  battle,  has  been  in  restoring  safety  and  tran 
quillity  wherever  it  has  planted  its  eagles. 

We  repeat,  then,  that  we  have  had  clearly  the  right  of  all  other  nations 
to  attack  and  weaken  our  enemy  ;  and  to  do  this  effectually,  our  armies  were 
of  necessity  compelled  to  advance. 

Besides  the  right,  we  have  seen  the  necessity  of  offensive  operations. 
Even  when  we  were  victorious,  pacific  overtures  again  made  to  Mexico 
have  been  allowed  to  sleep  on  the  table  of  her  Congress,  and,  as  far  as  events 
may  indicate,  the  policy  of  that  government  is  not  now  marked  by  a  desire 
for  peace  any  more  than  at  any  former  period  ;  and  the  truth  is,  peace  is  not 
the  element  by  which  Mexican  statesmen  gain  or  maintain  their  personal 
ascendancy.  The  Praetorians  of  the  Roman  Empire  were  not  more  in 
fluential  or  corrupt  in  their  day,  than  the  armies  which  in  Mexico  follow 
either  against  a  foreign  enemy,  or  even  their  own  countrymen,  the  bloody 
aspirants  to  power,  who  can  afford  the  greatest  amount  of  money,  or  are 
most  lavish  in  promises  of  future  bounty. 

With  an  offensive  war  thus  justified  in  every  possible  view,  a  line  of 
operations  was  marked  out,  which,  though  when  misunderstood  was  made  in 
some  quarters  the  subject  of  cavil,  is  now  admitted  to  discover  the  highest 
military  tact  and  genius. 

The  conduct  of  the  President  in  this  emergency  was  manly  and  patriotic, 
and  deserves  the  thanks  of  every  man  who  has  a  regard  for  the  honor  of  the 
country.  It  became  evident  to  him  that  local  operations  upon  the  Rio 
Grande,  or  along  the  Gulf  Coast,  however  brilliant  and  necessary,  were  not 
all  that  were  to  be  considered.  A  glance  at  the  map  of  North  America 
admonished  him  that  Mexico  rested  on  the  Pacific,  and  that  she  had  there  a 
military  organization  and  some  vessels  of  war.  He  perceived,  too,  the  dan 
ger  to  which  our  large  commercial  interests  in  that  ocean  might  be  sub 
jected,  and  he  also  regarded  those  important  interests  connected  with  the 
movements  of  our  western  trading  caravans,  and  the  programme  of  the 
campaign  was  constructed  accordingly.  While  these  interests  were  to  be 
secured  and  protected  on  the  one  hand,  Mexico  was  to  be  assailed  on  the 
other.  The  arrangement  of  our  forces  was  made  to  this  end,  and  the  most 
complete  success  attended  the  enterprise. 

The  expedition  of  Gen.  Kearney  to  Santa  Fe,  at  the  head  of  a  gallant 
though  not  numerous  army, — his  line  of  march  being  westward  from  Mis 
souri,  resulted  in  the  conquest  of  New  Mexico,  and  the  subsequent  occu 
pation  of  Upper  California.  Security  was  thus  given  to  our  trade  in  the 
Pacific,  and  ports  were  provided  for  the  accommodation  of  our  whaling  and 
merchant  vessels.  The  march  of  Gen.  Kearney  was  attended  with  success, 
unstained  by  any  acts  of  inhumanity  towards  the  inhabitants  of  those  pro 
vinces.  So  far  from  that,  a  temporary  code  of  law  has  been  promulgated 
under  the  authority  of  the  government,  which  for  the  first  time  illustrates  to 
a  down-trodden  race  the  blessings  of  civil  and  religious  liberty. 

The  expedition  of  Gen.  Wool,  equally  well  planned,  has  been  equally 
successful. 


10  The  Mexican  War — Its  Origin  and  Conduct. 

While  the  occupation  of  Santa  Fe  gave  our  forces  the  command  of  the 
passes  to  the  Pacific,  Gen.  Wool's  operations,  directed  for  many  hundred 
miles  westward  from  San  Antonio  de  Bexar,  gave  us  the  present  control  of 
another  large  portion  of  the  Mexican  territory,  cut  it  off  from  the  capital, 
prevented  its  taking  a  part  in  the  campaign  at  the  South,  and  enabled  him  to 
sweep  down  in  triumph  to  Saltillo,  to  unite  with  General  Taylor  and  threaten 
a  march  on  San  Luis  de  Potosi.  Meanwhile,  Mexico,  perfidious  to  the  last, 
is  to  be  assailed  at  a  point  where  her  best  and  greatest  strength  remains  ;  and 
thus  taken  at  last  in  her  own  net,  conquered  on  her  own  territory,  she  will 
be  compelled  to  listen  to  the  offers  of  peace  so  often  made  in  friendship,  and 
henceforward  to  be  presented  in  mercy. 

It  is  evident  from  this  glance  at  the  plan  of  the  campaign,  that  an  im 
mense  territory  has  been  captured  from  Mexico ;  and  that  all  our  military 
movements  have  been  in  harmony,  and  thus  far  completely  successful. 

It  is  the  opinion,  indeed,  of  eminent  engineers,  that  so  large  a  field  of 
operations  was  never  before  so  completely  attempted  by  a  small  army  ;  never 
with  such  means  was  so  much  acquired,  never  were  more  splendid  victories 
gained  at  such  odds. 

Co-operating  with  the  army,  our  navy  has  been  a  vigilant  and  powerful 
ally.  The  conduct  of  our  commanders  in  the  Pacific  and  in  the  Gulf  has 
been  the  subject  of  public  congratulation.  It  is  the  fortune  of  all  naval 
forces,  when  engaged  in  combined  operations,  to  be  subordinate  in  their 
movements  to  those  of  the  army,  and  their  reputation  sometimes  suffers 
under  the  accidents,  which  belong  to  a  lee  shore,  an  exposed  roadstead,  or 
the  difficulty  of  contrary  winds.  On  the  ocean,  a  ship  is  a  thing  of  life;  in 
a  harbor  it  is  but  a  battery.  Our  navy,  however,  under  all  these  disadvan 
tages,  has  added  to  its  established  fame,  and  will  be  found  ready  to  strike  a 
decisive  blow  when  the  proper  time  arrives. 

In  looking  at  the  results  of  the  war  in  Mexico,  we  cannot  but  notice  the 
remarkable  fact,  that  our  army  and  navy  have  covered  a  line  of  coast  and 
territory  of  2,500  miles  in  length,  without,  material  loss,  in  two  campaigns, 
while  tho^e  of  France,  after  eighteen  years  of  active  operations,  at  an  im 
mense  expenditure  of  money  and  life,  have  failed  as  yet  to  secure  even  the 
position  of.  one  city  in  Africa.  The  contrast  in  these  results  becomes  the 
more  surprising,  when  we  take  into  view  the  vast  disparity  between  the  mili 
tary  resources  of  that  nation  and  our  own. 

Among  the  inherent  difficulties  in  the  conduct  of  a  war  on  our  part,  are 
the  small  number  to  which  the  policy  of  the  country  has  limited  the  standing 
army,  and  the  delay  arising  from  the  action  of  Congress  in  providing  for  an 
accession  to  our  military  resources.  If  the  early  recommendations  of  the 
War  Department  had  been  promptly  attended  to,  vast  advantages  would 
have  accrued  to  ihe  service,  which  it  is  now  less  easy  to  secure. 

Incidental  difficulties  have  also  occurred  scarcely  less  formidable  and 
embarrassing.  The  ill-timed  correspondence  of  Gen.  Scott,  the  temporary 
resignation  of  Gen.  Worth,  the  precipitate  action  of  Gen.  Gaines,  and  the 
published  letter  of  Gen.  Taylor,  might  have  well  disturbed  as  serene  a  mind, 
and  ruffled  as  unclouded  a  brow  as  that  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  All  these 
matters  have  had  their  influence  in  distracting  the  public  mind,  and  have 
furnished  materials  for  assailing,  at  the  caprice  of  the  disaffected,  the  mo 
tives,  intentions  and  position  of  a  head  of  a  department,  who  was  eminently 
entitled,  in  his  arduous  position,  to  the  entire  support  and  sympathy  of  the 
country. 

And  now,  that  the  correspondence  between  Gen.  Taylor  and  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  has  been  published,  it  is  manifest  to  the  most  indifferent  obser 
ver,  that  much,  very  much,  has  been  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  American 
General ;  that  his  views  have  been  sought  in  the  most  friendly  manner  by  the 


The  Mexican  War. — Its  Origin  and  Conduct.  11 

administration,  and  in  the  most  friendly  spirit  received.  No  matter  how 
competent,  or  how  zealous  or  how  efficient  a  War  Department  of  itself  may 
be,  it  is  indispensable  that  confidence  should  be  reposed  in  the  Generals  it 
sends  to  the  field. 

The  military  correspondence  between  Secretary  Marcy  and  General  Tay 
lor  does  them  both  great  honor,  and  will  well  compare  with  that  collec 
tion  which  illustrates  the  Peninsular  war.  It  affords  a  complete  refutation 
of  those  audacious  calumnies  which  have  been  charged  upon  our  Govern 
ment — the  design  of  sacrificing  our  gallant  army ;  and  it  shows,  while  the 
necessity  of  the  conflict  was  forced  upon  us  by  the  vindictive,  unreasonable 
and  bloody  temper  of  the  Mexicans,  that  it  has  been  conducted  on  our  part 
with  chivalric  courtesy — with  a  desire  to  escape  the  effusion  of  blood,  and 
to  terminate  a  struggle  in  which  justice  and  equity  were  the  tribunals  to 
which  we  alone  wished  to  appeal. 

The  Secretary  of  War  knew  his  General,  and  the  General  appreciated 
the  views  of  his  superior.  Between  them  there  has  been  no  real  difficulty,  and 
there  justly  can  be  none.  It  is  for  those  who  are  ever  ready  to  assail  the 
Government — whose  feeling  is  disaffection,  and  whose  aliment  is  strife — to 
endeavor  to  create  all  the  mischief  in  their  power,  to  make  the  most  bold 
and  unfounded  charges  with  unblushing  front,  or 

"  Spargere  ambiguas  voces,1' 

and  assail  by  rumor  what  they  find  impregnable  to  violence. 

From  the  commencement  of  the  war  the  Secretary  has  been  fully  alive  to 
the  responsibilities  of  his  station,  his  duty  to  his  country,  and  the  respect  due 
to  himself.  In  all  his  conduct  he  has  shown  himself  far-seeing,  prompt  and  sa 
gacious.  He  has  anticipated  every  probable  difficulty  and  every  possible  fail 
ure.  Our  disturbed  relations  with  Mexico  belong  to  the  times,  and  on  our 
part  have  been  unavoidable.  We  owe  the  bloodshed  which  has  ensued  to 
Mexican  folly,  and  perhaps  Mexican  corruption.  The  War  Department 
has  thus  far  met  every  obstacle  calmly  and  successfully  ;  arid  whatever  of 
praise  we  might  choose  to  award  its  head  for  his  former  personal  services 
in  the  field  and  in  the  cabinet,  his  later  and  more  difficult  career  in  a  most 
trying  and  arduous  position  will  but  add  to  his  acquired  fame. 

"  It  is  a  solid  fabric,  and  will  support  the  laurels  that  adorn  it." 


Lithomount 
Pamphlet 

Binder 
Gaylord  Bros. 

Makers 
Stockton,  Calif. 

PAT.  JAN  21.  1908 


